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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME VII. JUNE, 1932 NUMBEa 2
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS WITH ANNOTATIONS TO
THE WASHINGTON DECISIONS
TO THE BENCH AND BAR or THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
The Committee of the Washington Bar Association appointed to
procure the preparation of the Washington Annotations to the Re-
statement of the Law by the American Law Institute welcomes this
opportunity to say an introductory word about the American Law
Institute and the Washington Annotations to the Restatement.
In 1923 a group of specially invited judges, practicing lawyers
and law teachers met in Washungton, D. C., to consider the report
of' a committee on the defects in the law. This committee was
headed by Elihu Root. It had long been recognized that the con-
fusion and complexity resulting from the multitude of new de-
cisions rendered annually was making it well-nigh impossible to
make adequate or satisfactory search for the law and it was recog-
nized that a remedy must be attempted. The meeting resulted m
the formation of the American Law Institute, which immediately
undertook the monumental task of restating the fundamental
principles of the common law. Recognizing the significance of
this undertaking, the Carnegie Foundation made a grant of $1,075-
000 to further the work of the Institute.
Since its inception the preparation of the Restatement has gone
forward under the guidance of the finest legal scholars in America.
Many of the leaders of bench, bar and law school faculties alike
are giving generously of their time and effort. The work is being
done with the utmost care and it is expected that by its inherent
excellence it will command the respect of the Courts.
The restatement of the various branches of the law is in the
hands of specialists in their particular field. The Restatement of
the Law of Contracts, done under the guidance of Professor Samuel
Williston of Harvard Law School, will soon be published in final
form. The Restatements of the Law of Agency and of the Conflict
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of Laws are rapidly nearing completion. In addition work is
steadily progressing on the restatement of other subjects.
As the preparation of the restatement progressed, it became ap-
pareat. that its usefulness to the lawyer and judge alike would be
greatly enhanced if there was some means of readily ascertaining
whether or not the particular statement of the law found in the
Restatement has ever been considered in the reported decisions
of the Courts of his own state, or whether there is a statute which
alters or affects that rule in his particular jurisdiction. The various
State Bar Associations were appealed to and the result was the
appointment of Cooperating Committees to prepare the Annota-
tions to the Restatement. Such committee was appointed in the
State of Washington early in the year 1931 by the President of the
Washington State Bar Association.
It is the function of the Annotators to take the restatement of
each branch of the law as it is prepared by the Institute, subject
it to critical analysis in the light of Washington decisions and
statutes and annotate it in such fashion that when the restate-
ment is ready and the annotations are laid beside it it will be
possible to say whether a certain proposition therein contained does
or does not coincide with the laws of the State of Washington on
that subject, and if it does not, what the cases or statutes are which
modify that law in its application to our state.
The committee realized at the very outset that the respect which
would be accorded the Annotations by the Bench and Bar of the
State of Washington would depend largely upon the ability and
reputation of the Annotators and the care with which the work was
done. It was also realized that no funds were available for com-
pensating those who would undertake this most time consuming
task. In view of these facts one can readily sense the satisfaction
of this committee when it was informed by Dean Shepherd both
that the University of Washington Law School faculty was will-
ing to undertake the preparation of the Annotations and that the
Washington Law Review was willing to publish the annotations
in its issues.
Our immediate goal is the completion of the Annotations to the
Restatement of the Law of Contracts. Professor Lantz and Dean
Shepherd have been engaged in their preparation for some time
and in this issue is printed the annotations prepared by Professor
Lantz to the first sections of this restatement. The annotations to
the remainder of Contracts will appear in subsequent issues. Pro-
fessor Ayer is at this time engaged in annotating the Restatement
to the Law of Agency
LAW OF CONTRACTS
This committee feels that the Bench and Bar of the State of
Washington are deeply indebted to the Dean and Faculty of the
University of Washington Law School.
COMMITTEE OF WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION ON ANNOTATIONS TO THE
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW BY THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
PAUL P. AsnLEy F D. METZGER
WILLIAM D. AsKREN J. AMBLER NEWTON
LESLIE J. AYER -EiMETT N. PARKER
GEORGE DONWORTH ALFRED J. SCHWEPPE
CLINTON H. HAnTSON WILLIAM J. STEINERT
CHARLES HoRowITz W V TANNER
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SECTION 8. Contracts under seal
1. Contract defined 9. Recognizances
2. Promise defined 10. Negotiable instruments
3. Agreement defined 11. Informal contracts
4. Bargain defined 12. Unilateral and bilateral
5. How a promise may be made contracts
6. Contracts classified 13. Voidable contracts
7. Formal contracts 14. Unenforceable contracts
Section 1. CONTRACT Dsrnqm.
A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach
of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of
which the law in some way recognizes as a duty.
Comment
a. A contract may consist of a single promise by one person to
another, or of mutual promises by two persons to one another; or
there may be, indeed, any number of persons or any number of
promises. One person may make several promises to one person or
to several persons, or several persons may join in making a single
promise to one or more persons. It is essential, however,'for the
formation of a single contract that all the promises shall form part
of a set. In other words they must be parts of a single. transaction.
b. It is not practicable in a definition of contract to state all the
operative facts that are necessary or sufficient, or to state all the
legal relations that are created by such facts. These will appear
with greater fullness in the succeeding Chapters and Sections.
* The absence of annotations to particular sections of the statement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated. The sections dealing with the definition of terms, obviously
require no annotations.
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c. It has been pointed out that the word contract is often used
to express indifferently
1. The acts which create the legal relations between the parties,
2. A writing which if not itself such an act is the evidence of
such acts,
3. The legal relations resulting from the operative acts.
As the term is used in the Restatement of this Subject, "con-
tract" includes not only the act of making a promise or promises
but the intangible duties which arise. Similarly "promise," un-
der the definition in Section 2, includes not merely the act of
speaking, but the continuous duty, whether moral or legal, which
a proisor assumes when he makes a promise. The separation is
not made in ordinary legal speech, and is not made in the Restate-
ment of this Subject, between the physical act of speaking words
of promise and the intangible duties which thereupon arise.
d. Not all the operative acts which are essential to create con-
tractual relations between the parties are included in the defin-
ition. It does not attempt to state what acts are essential. When
an act is done as the consideration for a unilateral contract (see
Section 12) and is essential to make the promise obligatory the
act is not a part of the promise, and hence is not part of the con-
tract as contract is here defined. Similarly, delivery is necessary to
make a sealed promise binding, but delivery is not part of the
contract.
e. The term contract is generic. As commonly used, and as here
defined, it includes varieties described as void, voidable, unenforce-
able, formal, informal, express, implied, unilateral, bilateral. In
these varieties neither the operative acts of the parties nor the
resulting relations are identical.
Section 2. PRoMisE DEFnED.
(1) A promise is an undertaking, however expressed,
either that something shall happen, or that something shall
not happen, in the future.
(2) Words which in terms promise the happening or fail-
ure to happen of something not within human control, or
the existence or non-existence of a present or past state of
facts, are to be interpreted as a promise or undertaking to
be answerable for such proximate damage as may be caused
by the failure to happen or the happening of the specified
event, or by the existence or non-existence of the asserted
state of facts.
Comment
a. Just as "contract" as used in this Restatement means not
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simply the act of promising, but duties arising therefrom, so "prom-
ise" means both physical manifestations by words or acts of
assurance and the moral duty to make good the assurance by per-
formance. If by virtue of other operative facts -the promise is
legally binding, the promise is a contract. The word promise,
though in ordinary use, frequently bears different shades of mean-
ing. So far as legal conceptions in the law of contracts are con-
cerned, it is immaterial whether a party to a contract undertakes
that he will personally do or refrain from doing something or that
he will cause something to come to pass. Even where the under-
taking relates to an existing or past fact, as in case of a war-
ranty that a horse is sound, or that a ship arrived m a foreign
port some days previously, the existence and validity of the under-
taking is dealt with in the same way as if the warrantor could
cause the fact to be as he asserted, though the meaning of words in
terms promising the existence of present or past facts must be
interpreted as stated m Subsection (2). Such contracts are made
when the parties are ignorant of the actual facts regarding which
they bargain, and in view of their ignorance it is immaterial for
purposes of contract that the actual condition of affairs is irrevoc-
ably fixed before the contract is made.
b. An apparent promise which according to its terms makes per-
formance optional with the promisor whatever may happen, or
whatever course of conduct m other respects he may pursue, is
in fact no promise. Such an expression is often called an illusory
promise.
c. A promise must be distinguished from a statement of inten-
tion or of opinion and from a mere prophecy As an unsealed prom-
ise is binding only if sufficient consideration is given for it, except
as is stated in Sections 85-94, and statements of intention or of
opinion or sounding merely in prophecy are not ordinarily given
for consideration, the distinction is not usually difficult. The
problem is, however, frequently presented m determining whether
the words of a seller of goods amount to a warranty.
Section 3. AGREEMENT DErUSSY.
An agreement is an expression of mutual assent by two or
more persons.
Comment:
a. Agreement has a wider meaning than contract, bargain or
promise. The word contains no implication that legal consequences
are or are not produced. It applies to transactions executed on
one or both sides, and also to those that are wholly executory
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Section 4. BARGAIN DEFrINED.
A bargain is an agreement of two or more persons to
exchange promises or performances.
Comment.
a. Bargain has a narrower meaning than agreement, since it is
applicable only to a particular class of agreements. It has a broader
meaning than contract, because it includes not only transactions of
which a promise forms a part, but also completely executed trans-
actions such as exchanges of goods (barters) or of services, or sales
where goods have been transferred and the price paid for them. It
also includes transactions where one party makes a promise and
the other gives something in exchange which is insufficient con-
sideration.
Section 5. How A PROMISE MAY BE MADE.
Except as stated in Section 72 (2), a promise in a contract
must be stated in such words either oral or written, or must
be inferred wholly or partly from such conduct, as justifies
the promisee in understanding that the promisor intended
to make a promise.
Comment.
a. Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The dis-
tinction involves, however, no difference in legal effect, but lies
merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Implied contracts must
be distingushed from quasi-contracts, which also have often been
called implied contracts or contracts implied in law. Quasi-con-
tracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent inten-
tion of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor
are they promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons
of justice. Such obligations were ordinarily enforced at common
law in the same form of action (assumpsit) that was appropriate
to true contracts, and some confusion with reference to the nature
of quasi-contracts has been caused thereby
Section 6. CONTRACTS CLASSIS'ED.
Contracts are classified as formal or informal; as uni-
lateral or bilateral.
Section 7. FORMAL CONTRACT.
Formal contracts are




a. Other contracts which by statute are required to be in writ-
ing or in some prescribed form are not classed as formal contracts.
The classification is made for convenience of reference and desig-
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nation. Contracts here classified as formal, in many cases, at
least, have some characteristics analogous to those of contracts
classified as informal. Promissory notes and bills of exchange,
especially, are often called informal contracts for this reason. In
many states also the effect of seals has been abolished by statute,
thereby doing away with Class (a).
Section 8. CONTRACTS UNDER SEAL.
A contract under seal is a contract expressed in a writing
which is sealed and delivered by the promsor.
Comment.
a. The rules governing the formation of sealed contracts are
stated in Sections 95-110. Where peculiar incidents are attached
to such contracts after their formation, attention is called to these
incidents in appropriate connections.
Section 9. RECOGNIZANCE.
A recognizance is an azknowledgement in court by the
recognizor that he is bound to make a certain payment
unless a specified condition is performed.
Comment:
a. Recognizances are in use chiefly to secure (1) the attendance
n o nurt at a future day of the recognizor, or (2) the prosecution of
an action, or (3) the payment of bail.
Section 10. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Negotiable instruments are such bills of exchange, promis-
sory notes, and bonds as are payable to bearer, or to the
order of a specified person. By statutes, in many States,
bills of lading and warehouse receipts, also, if running to
bearer or to the order of a specified person, are negotiable.
Comment.
a. The foregoing Section is inserted for completeness of enumer-
ation. The instruments referred to are to be treated of in a Restate-
ment especially devoted thereto. Certificates of shares of stock are
also made negotiable by statute in some States, but such certificates
do not usually contain promises.
Section 11. INFORAAr CONTRACTS.
Informal contracts are all others than those enumerated
as formal contracts m Section 7.
Comment:
a. Under this definition a wr-ten contract is an informal con-
tract unless it falls within one of the classes enumerated in Section
7. As stated in the Comment to that Section, the classification of
contracts as formal and informal is for convenience of reference
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and designation. Many contracts classified as informal have some
requisites of form.
b. By the English Statute of Frauds, enacted in 1677, a number
of contracts were made unenforceable unless evidenced by a writ-
ing. A great part of this statute has been re-enacted in all of the
United States, and other contracts besides those enumerated in the
English statute have frequently been subjected to the same formal
requirement. Rules applicable to such statutes are stated in Chap-
ter 8.
c. In a number of States by statute a written promise is pre-
sumed to have been made for sufficient consideration, though lack
of consideration, if proved, establishes the legal nullity of the
promise. In a very few States, the local statutes enact that a writ-
ten promise, like a sealed contract at common law, shall be binding
without consideration.
Informal contracts as that term is used in the Restatement of
this Subject are often called simple contracts.
Section 12. UNATERAL AND BILATERAL CONTRACTS.
A unilateral contract is one in which no promisor re-
ceives a promise as consideration for his promise. A bilateral
contract is one in which there are mutual promises between
two parties to the contract; each party being both a
promisor and a promisee.
Comment:
a. In a unilateral contract the exchange for the promise is some-
thing other than a promise, in a bilateral contract promises are
exchanged for one another.
b. There must always be at least two parties to a contract, whether
unilateral or bilateral, and there must usually be an expression
of assent by each. In many cases, however, a promise becomes a
contract even though no return promise is made by the promisee.
In such cases the legal duty is unilateral, resting on the promisor
alone. The correlative legal right is also unilateral, being pos-
sessed by the promisee alone. The statement often made that un-
less both parties are bound neither is bound is quite erroneous, as
a universal statement.
c. A unilateral contract is in a very real sense, as its name im-
plies, a one-sided contract. There are two parties to the contract,
it is true, and an expression of assent on the part of each is usually
necessary to its formation, but one of the requisites for making
the contract should not be confused with the contract itself. The
contract is merely the proaise, not the mutual expression of assent
nor the consideration paid for the promise. In a bilateral contract,
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on the other hand, as there are contractual promises on both sides,
the contract is properly called bilateral.
d. Contracts are possible where there are more than two parties,
but in disputes between any two of them, the principles applicable
to the simpler forms of contracts will generally aid in the analysis
of the rights and duties of the parties.
e. Contracts are also possible under Section 75 (2) where A
promises B in consideration of B' promise to C, or in consideration
of C's promise to A. The promises in such cases are not mutual,
and therefore, do not fall within the definition of bilateral contract.
In view of possible differences in legal treatment they may properly
be kept separate.
Section 13. VOIDABLE CONTRACTS.
A voidable contract is one where one or more parties
thereto have the power, by a manifestation of election to
do so, to avoid the legal relations created by the contract;
or by ratification of the contract to make it valid and
enforceable.
comment:
a. Typical instances of voidable contracts are those where one or
both parties are infants; or where the contract was induced by
fraud, mistake, or duress, or where breach of a warranty or of
another promise justifies the injured party in rescinding a bargain
or avoiding its legal effect. Usually the power to avoid is confined
to one party to the contract, but wnere, for instance, both parties
are infants, or where both parties enter into the contract under
such a mutual mistake as affords grounds for rescission by a court
of equity, the contract may be voidable by either one of the parties.
b. The consequence of avoidance in some cases is to entitle the
party who avoids the contract to be restored to a position as good
as that which he occupied immediately before the formation of
the contract, in other cases to leave the situation of the parties
m the same condition as at the time of the avoidance.
c. In many cases it is a condition qualifying a power of avoidance
that the original situation of the parties can be and shall be restored
at least substantially, but this is not necessarily the case. An infant,
for instance, in many jurisdictions is allowed to avoid his contract
without this qualification, so that wherz the infant exercises his
power the parties frequently are left in a very different situation
from that which existed when the contract was made.
d. In some contracts included under the designation of voidable
contracts, it is unnecessary for one who wishes to avoid them to
take promptly the position of an actor. No manifestation of in-
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tention is necessary until an action is brought against him. He
may, however, by ratifying the transaction make the contract en-
forceable.
e. Where both parties have a power of avoidance the propriety
of calling the transaction a voidable contract rather than calling
the transaction void, is due to the fact that action is necessary in
order to prevent the contract from producing the ordinary legal
consequences of a contract, and often this action in order to be
effectual must be taken promptly Moreover, ratification by either
party may terminate his power of avoidance.
Special Note: A promise or set of promises for breach of which
the law neither gives a remedy nor otherwise recognizes a duty of
performance by the promisor, is often called a void contract, but
this is a contradiction in terms in view of the definition of contract
in Section 1.
In Jenk's Digest of English Civil Law, Section 182, a contract
is defined as including any agreement where the parties tntended to
create a legal obligation, and only under this artificial nomen-
clature could an agreement by which the parties intended to create
such an obligation but which did not accomplish their intention,
properly be called a void contract.
Section 14. UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS.
An unenforceable contract is one which the law does not
enforce by legal proceedings, but recognizes in some in-
direct or collateral way as creating a duty of performance,
though there has been no ratification.
Comment.
a. Both voidable and unenforceable contracts, as they have been
classified in the Restatement of this Subject, frequently involve
a power on the part of one or the other of the parties to create the
full contractual rights and duties of an ordinary contract. If this
were their only effect they might be classified together, but in the
transactions classified as unenforceable some legal consequences,
other than the creation of a power of ratification, follow without
further action by either party
Chapter 2
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
SECTION SECTION
15. Parties required 17. When a person may be both
16. Joint, several, joint and several promisor and promisee
promisors and promisees. 18. Necessity for contractual ca
pacity.
Section 15. PARTIES REQUIRED.
There must be at least two parties in a contract, but may
be any greater number.
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Comment:
a. It is not possible under existing law for a man to make a con-
tract with himself. This rule is one of substance and independent
of mere procedural requirements. Even though a man has different
capacities, as for instance as trustee, as executor, as partner, as an
individual, it is impossible as a matter of substantive law for him
by his own individual will or expressions to contract with himself.
As will be seen under the following sections, it is another question
whether a contract may be formed in which the same person is one
of several on one side of a bargain, and either alone or with others
a party to the other side. The question is also distinct whether a
contract is necessarily discharged where one.party becomes both
obligor and obligee and there are no other parties to the contract.
b. Several persons may act together, as in the case of a partner-
ship, either as prommors or promisees, and where parties are thus
acting jointly, they are for many purposes regarded as a single
unit. But there are also contracts in which a number of persons
are parties and where each has several interests. Thus any number
of persons may promise a certain performance to one or to any
number of persons in return for acts or return promises, and all
may be part of the same transaction.
Section 16. JoINT, SEVERAL, JOINT AND SEVERAL PROMsORS AND
PnomsES.
Where there are more promisors than one in a contract,
some or all of them may promise jointly as a unit, or some
or all of them may each promise severally, or some or all
of them may promise jointly and severally. Where there are
more promisees than one m a contract, promises may be
made to some or all of them jointly as a unit or to some or
all of them severally, or to some or all of them jointly and
severally.
Comment:
a. Procedure in English and American courts in actions at law,
when there has been no statutory change fusing legal and equitable
procedure, permits but two sides to a litigation, that of the plaintiff
and that of the defendant. Either the side of the plaintiff or
that of the defendant may consist of more than one person, but all
the persons joined as plaintiffs must assert a common right, and all
the persons joined as defendants must be charged with a common
duty.
b. As matter of substantive law, however, an indefinite number
of persons may contract with one another; each one of the persons
or groups of the persons promising either one or any number of the
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others, whether dealing with them individually or jointly as a
unit. If all the promises are entered into as part of a single trans-
action, they form part of one contract.
c. In equity there has never been the requirement that the par-
ties to a suit must consist of merely two units, one seeking to en-
force a right against the other. On the contrary, any number of
diverse and conflicting interests can be dealt with under equity
procedure, and under the code procedure, now enacted in most
of the United States, the same thing is true.
Section 17 WHEN A PERSON MAY BE BOTH PROMISOR AND
PROMSE.
A contract may be formed between two or more persons
acting as a unit and one or more but fewer than all of these
persons, acting either singly or with other persons.
Comment:
a. This section is applicable to both unilateral and bilateral con-
tracts, and like the other sections in this chapter is applicable both
to formal and to informal contracts.
b. The rule does not touch upon the rightfulness of making such
contracts as fall within its terms. In a particular case such a con-
tract might be voidable for fraud or for other reasons.
Section 18. NEcEssITY FOR CONTRIACTUAL, CAPAcITY.
No one can be bound by contract who has not legal
capacity to incur at least voidable contractual obligations.
Contractual incapacity may be total or may be only partiaL
Comment:
a. Capacity, as here used, means legal power. The legal powers
possessed by natural or artificial persons can be set forth only when
the various classes are separately considered.
b. It is only where his contractual incapacity is total that it can
be laid down broadly that a party to a transaction cannot enter
into a contract.
Chapter 3
FORMATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACTS
TOPIC A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
SECTION
19. Requirements of the law for for-
mation of an informal contract. F-
TOPIC B. MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT
SECTION SECTION
20. Manifestation of mutual assent 25. When a manifestation of inten-
necessary tention is not an offer
21. Acts as manifestation of assent. 26. Contract may exist though writ-
22. Offer and acceptance, ten memorial is contemplated
23. Necessity of communication of an 27. Auctions; sales without reserve
offer 28. To whom an offer may be made24. Offer defined 29. How an offer may be accepted
LAW OF CONTRACTS
SECTION
30. Offer may propose a single con-
tract or a number of contracts
31. Presumption that offer invites a
bilateral contract
32. Offer must be reasonably certain
in its terms
33. An indefinite offer may create a
contract upon performance by of-
feree
34. Offer until terminated may be ac-
cepted
35. How an offer may be terminated;
effect of termination
36. What is a rejection of an offer
37. Communication by offeree declin-
ing the offer is a rejection
38. Counter-offer by offeree is a re-
jection
39. Time when rejection is effective
40. What lapse of time terminates an
offer
41. Revocation by communication
from offeror received by offeree
42. Acquisition by offeree of informa-
tion that offeror has sold or con-
tracted to sell offered interest
43. How an offer made by advertise-
ment or general notice may be re-
voked
44. Revocation of offer contemplating
a series of contracts
45. Revocation of offer for unilateral
contract; effect of part perform-
ance or tender
46. Offers which are themselves con-
tradts cannot be terminated
47. Offers which offeror has collater-
ally contracted to keep open can-
not be terminated
48. Termination of offer by offeror's
death or insanity
49. Termination of offer by death of
essential person or destruction of
essential thing
50. Termination of offer by illegality
51. Effect of delay in communication
of offer
52. Acceptance of offer defined
53. Necessity for knowledge of offer
54. Who may accept an offer
55. Acceptance of offer fbr unilateral
contract; necessity of intent to
accept
56. Acceptance of offer for unilateral
contract; necessity of notice to
offeror
57. Unilateral contract where pro-
posed act is to be done by offeror
58. Acceptance must be unequivocal
59. Acceptance must comply with
terms of offer
60. Purported acceptance which adds
qualifications
61. Acceptance of offer which states
place, time or manner of accept-
ance
62. Acceptance which requests change
of terms
63. Effect of performance by offeree
where offer requests promise
64. How acceptance may be trans-
mitted; time when it takes effect.
65. Acceptance by telephone
66. When a particular means of trans-
mission is authorized
67. Acceptance by mall or from a dis.
tance, when valid upon despatch
68. When an acceptance inoperative
when despatched is operative up-
on receipt by offeror
69. What constitutes receipt of revo-
cation, rejection, or acceptance
70. An offeror or acceptor of a writ-
ten offer is bound by its terms.
71. Undisclosed understanding of af.
feror or offeree, when material
72. Acceptance by silence
73. Effect of receipt by offeror of a
late or otherwise defective accept.
ance
74. Time when and place where a
contract is made
TOPIC C. CONSIDERATION AND ITS SUFFICIENCY
SECTION
75. Definition of consideration
76. When acts or forbearance are suf-
ficient consideration
77. A promise is generally sufficient
consideration
78 A promise Is insufficient consid-
eration if its performance would
obviously be insufficient
79. A promise in the alternative as
consideration
80. A promise which is not binding is
generally insufficient considera-
tion
SL Adequacy of value of considera-
tion is immaterial
%2. A recital ot consideration Is not
conclusive proof
83. One consideration may support a
number of promises
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TOPIC D. INFORMAL CONTRACTS WITHOUT ASSENT
OR CONSIDERATION
SECTION SECTION
85. Assent or consideration unneces- 90. Promise reasonably Inducing def.
sary in cases enumerated in Sec- imite and substantial action is
tions 86-90 binding
86. Promise to pay a debt is binding 91. Promises enumerated in Sections
though the debt is barred by the 86-90 if conditional are perform-
Statute of Limitations able only on happening of condi-
87. Promise to pay a debt discharged dition
in bankruptcy is binding 92. To whom promises enumerated in
88. Promise to fulfill a duty in spite Sections 86-89 must be made
of non-performance of a condition 93. Promises enumerated in Sections
is binding when 86-89 not binding if made in ig.
89. Promise to perform a voidable norance of facts
duty is binding 94. Stipulations
TOPIC A. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
Section 19. REQUIREMENTS OF THE LAW FOR FORMATION OF AN
INFORMAL CONTRACT.
The requirements of the law for the formation of an
informal contract are:
(a) A promisor and a promisee each of whom has legal
capacity to act as such in the proposed contract;
(b) A manifestation of assent by the parties who form
the contract to the terms thereof, and by every promisor to
the consideration for his promise, except as otherwise stated
in Sections 85 to 94;
(c) A sufficient consideration except as otherwise stated
in Sections 85 to 94;
(d) The transaction, though satisfying the foregoing re-
quirements, must be one that is not void by statute or by
special rules of the common law.
Comment:
a. The explanation of the requirements of Clause (a) belongs
in the Restatement of the law of Persons, the explanation of the
requirements of Clause (d) is given in a later chapter of the Restate-
ment of Contracts, the explanation of the requirements of Clauses
(b) and (c) is given m the following sections of this chapter.
TOPIC B. MANIFESTATION OF ASSENT
Section 20. MANIFESTATION OF MUTUAL ASSENT NECESSARY.
A manifestation of mutual assent by the parties to an
informal contract is essential to its formation and the acts
by which such assent is manifested must be done with the
intent to do those acts; but, except as qualified by Sections
55, 71 and 72, neither mental assent to the prom-ses in the
contract nor real or apparent intent that the promises shall
be legally binding is essentiaL
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Comment:
a. Mutual assent to the formation of informal contracts is oper-
ative only to the extent that it is manifested. Moreover, if the
manifestation is at variance with the mental intent, subject to the
slight exception stated in Section 71, it is the expression which is
controlling. Not mutual assent but a manifestation indicating such
assent is what the law requires. Nor is it essential that the parties
are conscious of the legal relations which their words or acts give
rise to. It is essential, however, that the acts manifesting assent
shall be done intentionally That is, there must be a conscious
will to do those acts, but it is not material what induces the will.
Even insane persons may so act, but a somnambulist could not.
Section 21. Acrs As MANIFESTATIO oF ASSN.
The manifestation of mutual assent may consist wholly
or partly of acts, other than written or spoken words.
Comment:
a. Words are not the only medium of expression. Conduct may
often convey as clearly as words a promise or an assent to a pro-
posed promise, and where no particular requirement of form is
made by the law a condition of the validity or enforceability of a
contract, there is no distinction in the effect of a promise whether
it is expressed (1) in writing, (2) orally, (3) in acts, or (4) partly
in one of these ways and partly m others
ANNOTATION
Where a teacher was re-elected by a board of education for the
ensuing year, and upon being notified thereof by the secretary of the
board, expressed to him gratitude that she was "to have the same
work," and during vacation consulted with the principal at his request
in regard to the proposed work, her acceptance of the appointment was
sufficiently shown: MacKenzie v. State, 32 W 657, 73 P. 889 (1903),
'Where L offered In writing to supply S with specific materials for a build-
ing for $312 and to furnish extras at market price, and S wrote in reply,
"I have decided to accept your bid, but I do this work with the under-
standing this includes all material to finish said building," and L, with.
out objecting to this conditional acceptance of his bid, proceeded to
furnish the materials, he must be held to have assented to S's terms and
to have contracted to furnish all necessary materials for the total price
of $312: GitteRl -v. Saulsberry, 40 W. 550, 82 P. -909 (1905). Defendant
wrote plaintiff, offering to assume payment of $800 for the printing of a
catalogue "on condition that there will be no additional charges beyond
-the price of $800." Plaintiff replied by letter, "We beg to accept your
proposition with the understanding that we are to have $800 for the
catalogue-and no changes to be made in your copy or corrections except
at your expense.-We believe there will be no changes necessary, but,
In case there are, we will expect $1.25 per hour for composition changes."
Without deciding whether the acceptance was conditional, but doubting
that it was, the court held, that the parties, having treated the .corre.
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spondence as an existing contract, a contract was formed: General Lith.
d P Co. v. Washington Rubber Co., 55 W 461, 104 P 650 (1909).
A signed appointment of an agent for the management of property and
collection of rents, accepted and acted upon by the appointee, though not
signed by him, constitutes a binding contract: Amherst Inv. Co. v. Meachaim,
69 W 284, 124 P 682 (1912). A writing, signed by defendant, by which
he undertakes to secure a patent of certain lands for plaintiff, in consider-
ation of $500 received of plaintiff and of $500 more to be paid when
patent is obtained, delivered to and accepted by plaintiff, is binding
though not signed by him: Hunter v. Byron, 92 W 469, 159 P. 703 (1916).
A memorandum, signed by plaintiff, stating, "I sell to D 6,000 bushels
Blue Stem wheat, basis No. one grade-at $1.031 per bushel--delivery-
on or before Sept. 30, 1916," upon which D wrote "Confirmed" and signed
it, is a contract binding on both parties, D, by.his said acts, having bound
himself to purchase the wheat upon the terms stated: Dement Bros. v.
Coon, 104 W 603, 177 P 354 (1919). The payee's acceptance and
endorsement of a check which stated, "to invest Wenatchee Orchard Co.
until called for 10 per cent guaranteed," together with evidence of the
circumstances under which the check was given, are sufficient to show
a binding obligation upon the payee to repay the money on demand with
10 per cent interest: Griffin. v. Lear 123 W 191, 212 P. 271 (1923).
A written agreement for the furnishing of moving picture films which
provides that It shall not become binding until accepted in writing by
an officer of the producer and written notice of acceptance sent to the
exhibitor within 25 days, is effective and complete as a contract where it
was accepted in writing by an officer of the producer within the time
limited and thereafter partly performed by the delivery and acceptance
of films although the record contained no evidence of the sending-of notice
of its final approval: Educational Film Exchange v. Praggastis, 144 W.
289, 257 P 845 (1927). A written contract for the exchange of proper-
ties, containing a provision for the payment of a commission to certain
brokers for services to be rendered by them In consummating the ex-
change, which was accepted and acted upon by the brokers, though not
signed by them, became their contract as effectively as if they had signed
it: Miskey v. Mazey, 150 W 676, 274 P. 698 (1929).
Section 22. OFFER AND AccEPTANcE.
The manifestation of mutual assent almost invariably
takes the form of an offer or proposal by one party accepted
by the other party or parties.
Comment:
a. This rule is rather one of necessity than of law In the nature
of the case one party must ordinarily first announce what he will do
before there can be any manifestation of mutual assent. It is
theoretically possible for a third person to state a suggested con-
tract to the parties and for them to say simultaneously that they
assent to the suggested bargain, but such a case is so rare, and the
decision of it so clear that it is practically negligible.
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Section 23. NECESSITY OF COMMUNICATION OF AN OFFER.
Except as qualified by Section 70, it is essential to the
existence of an offer that it be a proposal by the offeror to
the offeree, and that it becomes known to the offereeo It is
not essential that the manifestation shall accurately convey
the thought in the offeror's mind.
Comment:
a. Two manifestations of willingness to make the same bargain do
not constitute a contract unless one is made with reference to the
other. An offeree, therefore, cannot accept an offer unless it has
been communicated to him by the offeror. This may be done
through the medium of an agent, but mere information indirectly
received by one party that another is willing to enter into a cer-
tain bargain is not an offer by the latter.
Section 24. OFFE D'EDna.
An offer is a promise which is in its terms conditional
upon an act, forbearance or return promise being given m
exchange for the promise or its performance. An offer is
also a contract, commonly called an option, if the requisites
of a formal or an informal contract exist, or if the rule
stated in Section 47 is applicable.
Comment:
a. In an offer for a unilateral contract the offeror's promise
is conditional upon an act other than a promise being given except
in cases covered by Section 57. In an offer for a bilateral contract
the offeror's promise is always conditional upon a return promise
being given. The return promise may be in ihe form of assent to
the proposal in the offer. In order that a promise shall amount to
an offer, performance of the condition in the promise must appear
by its terms to be the price or exchange for the promise of its per-
formance. The promise must not be merely performable on a certain
contingency
b. All offers are promises of the kind stated in this section and
all promises of this kind are offers if there has been no prior offer
of the same tenor to the promisor. But if there has already been
such an offer to enter into a bilateral contract, an acceptance there-
of, like the offer itself, will be a promise of the kind stated in the
Section.
Specal Note: The word "option" is often used for a continuing
offer although it is revocable for lack of consideration, but more
commonly the word is used to denote an offer which is irrevocable
and therefore a contract.
Speczal Note: An offer necessarily looks to the future. It is an
expression by the offeror of his agreement that something over
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which he at least assumes to have control shall be done or happen
or shall not be done or happen if the conditions stated in the
offer are complied with. Even in cases which seem at first sight
to involve no promise by the offeror, analysis will disclose that such
a promise exists, if the word is given the definition in Section 2. In
such a case as that in Illustration 1,0 it may be urged that the offeror
is expected to do nothing in fulfillment of his offer, that he has
simply given a power to the offeree by virtue of which the latter on
promising to pay the price will immediately become owner of the
chattel. But though the owner need do nothing in fulfillment of his
offer, and though it is self-operative if accepted, it nevertheless in-
volves a promise on the part of the offeror that the offeree shall be-
come owner of the chattel if he accepts during the continuance of
the offer. This is shown by the fact that the offeror would be liable to
the acceptor if he had no title to the chattel and therefore the offeree
acquired none by his acceptance; yet the question whether the words
of the offeror amount to a promise can hardly depend on the extrin-
sic facts determining his ownership or lack of it. Though the offeror
is to do nothing, he does undertake or promise that something shall
come to pass on the performance of the condition stated in the
offer.
Moreover, an offer which does not in terms state that it is revoc-
able includes a promise, though not a binding promise, that the
power given by the offer shall continue for the period named in the
offer, or, if no period is named, for a reasonable time, and even
if in terms revocable at any moment, it is still a promise, operative
until revoked.
Confusion sometimes is caused by regarding an offer and a con-
tract as antithetical. But since an offer is a promise, and as a
promise becomes a contract if consideration is given for it or if it
is under seal (where the common-law effect of seals is unchanged)
an offer may also be a contract.
Section 25. WHEN A MANIFESTATION OF INTENTION is NoT AN
OmL
If from a promise, or manifestation of intention, or from
the circumstances existing at the time, the person to whom
the promise or manifestation is addressed knows or has
reason to know that the person making it does not intend
it as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given
a further expression of assent, he has not made an offer.
*A says to B, "This book is yours if you promise to pay me $5 for It."




a. It is often difficult to draw an exact line between offers and
negotiations preliminary thereto. It is common for one who wishes
to make a bargain to try to induce the other party to the intended
transaction to make the definite offer, he himself suggesting with
more or less definiteness the nature of the contract he is willing to
enter into. Besides any direct language indicating an intent to
defer the formation of a contract, the definiteness or indefinite-
ness of the words used in opening the negotiation must be con-
sidered, as well as the customs of business, and indeed all sur-
rounding circumstances.
ANNOTATION
A letter proposing a sale of corporate stock, within the Statute of
Frauds, which shows upon its face that there had been prior oral
negotiations and contains matters of detail necessarily unintelligible
to the receiver of the letter, were he not aided by the previous negotia-
tions; which indicates that there were liens on the corporate property
which would have to be dealt with before a sale could be consummated;
and mentions the granting of an option after the termination of an exist-
Ing option to other parties, yet does not state the terms or conditions of
the option to be granted, but recites that "final agreement can be ar-
ranged for and the deal concluded on the day following expiration of the
existing option," does not constitute a binding offer which can be converted
into a contract by acceptance: Coleman v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co.,
110 W. 259, 188 P. 532 (1920). A letter from the vice-president of
a corporation to a dissatisfied stockholder, containing explanations which
he manifestly hoped would satisfy the stockholder, and in which he ex-
pressed a willingness to- buy back the stock, without specifying the terms
of the agreement, and containing no words of present promise, Is not an
agreement to buy the stock but only an offer to make an agreement:
Richardson v. Hunter, 88 W 375, 153 P. 325 (1915).
Section 26. CONTRACT MAY EXIST THOUGH WRITTEN MEMORIAL
IS CONTEMPLATED.
Mutual manifestations of assent that are in themselves
sufficient to make a contract will not be prevented from so
operating by the mere fact that the parties also manifest an
intention to prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof;
but other facts may show that the manifestations are merely
preliminary expressions as stated in Section 25.
Comment:
a. Parties who plan to make a final written instrument as the
expression of their contract, necessarily discuss the proposed terms
of the contract before they enter into it, and often before the final
writing is made, agree upon all the terms which they plan to incor-
porate therein. This they may do orally or by exchange of several
writings. It is possible thus to make a contract to execute subse-
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quently a final writing which shall contain certain provisions. If
parties have definitely agreed that they will do so, and that the
final writing shall contain these provisions and no others, they have
then fulfilled all the requisites for the formation of a contract.
On the other hand, if the preliminary agreement is incomplete, it
being apparent that the determination of certain details is deferred
until the writing is made out-, or if an intention is manifested in
anyway that legal obligations between the parties shall be deferred
until the writing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agree-
ments do not constitute a contract.
b. The matter may be put in this way If the parties indicate that
the expected document is to be a mere "memorial" of operative
facts already existing, its non-existence does not prevent those
facts from having their normal legal operation. What that opera-
tion is must be determined largely by oral testimony, or by prelim-
inary or only partially complete writings. If the parties indicate
that the expected document is to be the exclusive operative consum-
mation of the negotiation, their preceding communications will not
be operative as offer or acceptance. This also must be shown largely
by oral testimony.
c. If the written document is prepared and executed, the legal
relations of the parties are then largely determined by that docu-
ment, because of the so-called "Parol Evidence Rule," even though
there was a binding informal contract previously made (see Sec-
tion 233).
ANNOTATION
A contract for the sale of a crop of hops may be consummated by
letters and telegrams, although the negotiating parties may -have
intended that a more formal contract should be subsequently exe-
cuted, where the correspondence discloses that the subject matter and
terms have been agreed upon and that the parties intended to enter into a
contract prior to the execution of the formal writing: Loewt v. Long, 76
W 480, 136 P. 673 (1913). A contract Is consummated by a written
offer to sell two cars dried apples at a price and on terms stated, and its
due acceptance by the offeree by telegram; with confirmation by letter,
notwithstanding that the offerer, in a letter to the offeree, acknowledging
the telegraphic acceptance, added, "If you will let us have regular rail
contract duly filled in, we will sign same on receipt," which was not
done: Washzngton Dehydrated Food Co. v. Triton Co., 151 W. 613, 276 P.
562 (1929). Where parties, by oral negotiation for the logging of
certain land, came to an agreement as to the work to be done, the time
when it should be begun, the place of delivery and the price, but left
details as to payment to be arranged later, with the understanding that
a written contract should be executed in which the details were to be
stated, which was never done, no contract was consummated: McDonnelU
v. Coeur dAlene Lumber Co. 56 W 495 106 P 135 (1910). A written
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bid to do the carpenter work on a certain building for a specified sum
In accordance with plans, but which did not specify when the work should
be commenced or completed, nor the character of the work or time of
payment, and which contained the statement, "Formal contract to follow,"
though the person to whom It was addressed wrote "Accepted" thereon
and signed his name thereto, does not constitute a contract, the bidder
not having forwarded, for execution, a formal contract embodying the
essential details of the work: Stanton v. Dennts, 64 W 85, 116 P. 650
(1911). Defendant who was Intending to bid upon some construction
work for a city, agreed with plaintiff that If he would furnish an estimate
of the cost of one certain section of the work, Section 8, defendant would
use this estimate in making his bid for the whole work and that If the
contract were awarded to him he would sublet Section 8 to plaintiff at
the figures furnished. Plaintiff made and submitted an estimate of the
cost of Section 8, but as it was in excess of the limit fixed by the city,
was not used by defendant as a basis for his bid for the whole work. The
general contract was awarded to defendant. It was customary for sub-
contractors to furnish estimates upon portions of the work to a general
contractor prior to the bidding upon general contract. Held that no con-
tract was made between plaintiff and defendant; their negotiations indicat-
ing merely a purpose to enter into a subcontract, which should be re-
duced to writing when the terms were later agreed upon: Meacham v.
Pederson, 70 W. 479, 127 P 114 (1912). Where the original draft of
a contract for the sale of box shooks was reduced to writing, signed by
the buyer and forwarded to the seller who made certain changes therein,
signed and forwarded it to the buyer, who, though accepting the changes,
made other changes and insisted upon a contract without interlineations
or erasures, and, after further changes were made and assented to, It
was further agreed that a writing, containing the terms upon which the
parties had then agreed, should be signed by the presidents of the respec-
tive parties, which was never done, no contract was ever completed:
Epsom Packing Co. v. Lamb-Dams Lumber Co., 112 W. 75, 191 P. 833
(1920). Agreement as to the terms of a contract for the sale of a mov-
ing picture business reached through correspondence between the parties
does not constitute a completed contract where the parties contemplated
the execution of a formal written instrument: Jammie v. Robinson, 114 W.
275, 195 P 6 (1921). Where, in response to plaintiff's order for
150,000 box shooks to conform to specifications and at prices 'previously
furnished and quoted by defendant, defendant replied, "today we are
sending contracts-and as soon as these are returned to us signed-we
will be ready to go ahead on deliveries," but contracts were never sent
or signed, no contract was consummated: Pennington & Co. -v. Hedlund
Box & S. Co., 116 W 292, 199 P. 235 (1921). Although a call for bids
for the construction of a building requires the posting of certified checks
by bidders for 5 per cent of the amount bid, and does not reserve the right
to reject all bids, the owner not having agreed to accept the lowest bid
is not bound to do so, especially when the call requires the "successful
bidder" to enter into a contract with the owner within five days after
the work is awarded to him, or forfeit the amount of his check: Bromley
v. McHugh, 122 V 361, 210 P. 809 (1922).
*To be continued.
